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We owe to Professor Parpola two illuminating articles on the formation of M¥måµså1 
(Parpola 1981; 1994), and at least one further article on this topic is expected from him. In 
the articles that have so far appeared, Parpola ‘argued for the original unity of a single 
M¥måµsåsËtra ..., which was later split into two: the PËrvam¥måµsåsËtra ... ascribed to 
Jaimini, and the Uttaram¥måµsåsËtra ... ascribed to Bådaråyaˆa. [He] also analysed the 
teacher quotations of the [M¥måµsåsËtra] and [compared] them with the evidence found in 
the ritual SËtras of the Veda, [both of] the Black Yajurveda [and] the White Yajurveda.’ 
(1994: 293). These two articles, by their very nature and intent, concentrate on the parallels 
between the M¥måµsåsËtra and the ritual SËtras, and therefore on the continuity between 
them.2 However, M¥måµså — and from now on I will use this expression primarily to refer 
to the so-called PËrvam¥måµså — is more than merely the outcome of a continuous 
development of the ideas and concerns which we find in the ritual SËtras. At some period 
in its history M¥måµså underwent one or more dramatic breaks with its predecessors, 
which allowed it to become an independent school of thought. 
 Two discontinuities in particular deserve attention: (1) The Írauta SËtras belong, 
each of them, to their own Vedic schools, and describe the rituals as carried out in those 
schools; as against this, M¥måµså claims the unity of ritual practice and the fundamental 
identity of the ritual acts prescribed in the different schools. (2) M¥måµså further innovates 
in introducing and elaborating a number of ‘philosophical’ notions, most important among 
them the belief in the beginninglessness [84] (anåditva), authorlessness (apauru∑eyatva) and 
self-sufficient validity (svata˙pråmåˆya) of the Veda. It seems likely that the attempt at 
unification that expresses itself in the first discontinuity was the result of an increasingly 
                                                
* I thank Kiyotaka Yoshimizu for useful criticism. 
1 Parpola speaks of the M¥måµså; I will simply speak of M¥måµså. 
2 Cp. Parpola 1981: 164: "There can be no doubt that the M¥måµsåsËtra directly continues the tradition of the 
Vedic ritualists ... The formation of the M¥måµsåsËtra can certainly be reconstructed to a great extent by 
comparing it carefully with the existing KalpasËtras." 
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frequent interaction between at least certain representatives of the different Vedic schools.3 
The second discontinuity — the introduction and elaboration of a number of remarkable 
‘philosophical’ notions — may, as I will argue, be accounted for as an attempt to face 
critical outsiders. 
 M¥måµså never fully replaced the ritual traditions of the Vedic schools. We know, 
for example, that Bhart®hari, a philosopher from the fifth century C.E., though acquainted 
with M¥måµså, refers for ritual details to the handbooks of his own Vedic school, that of 
the Månava-Maitråyaˆ¥yas (Bronkhorst 1985; 1989: 105 (375-376)). Other authors 
explicitly prescribe that sacrificers should adhere to the manuals of their own schools 
(Deshpande 1999). The M¥måµsåsËtra itself (2.4.8-9), finally, first records the position 
according to which there are differences between the rituals in different Vedic schools, then 
rejects it. All these passages reveal a certain amount of resistance against M¥måµså that 
was apparently felt by a number of orthodox Brahmins, presumably from the very 
beginning.4 
 This is not the place to study in further detail the first discontinuity mentioned 
above. Instead we turn to the second one: the introduction and elaboration of the three 
doctrines of the beginninglessness (anåditva), authorlessness (apauru∑eyatva) and self-
sufficient validity (svata˙pråmåˆya) of the Veda. In combination they constitute a peculiar 
set of doctrines, even in the Indian context in which they arose. There is nothing in the 
contemporary schools of thought, whether Brahminical, Buddhist, or Jaina, corresponding 
to this set as worked out in M¥måµså. The preceding Vedic tradition itself contains nothing 
of the kind, either. Indeed, the Vedic Brahmins held — still in the days of Megasthenes5 — 
the opposite opinion that the world (and therefore presumably the Veda) does have a 
beginning in time. The schools of philosophy that arose beside M¥måµså believed in the 
beginninglessness of the universe, to be sure, but they all accepted, unlike M¥måµså, the 
periodic destruction and recreation of the world.6 Why then did M¥måµså invent and 
accept this strange set of doctrines? What could the M¥måµsakas possibly gain by doing 
[85] so? Predictably, none of our sources proposes any answers, for these doctrines are not 
                                                
3 Parpola is of the opinion that Kåtyåyana the author of the Kåtyåyana Írauta SËtra is later than Jaimini 
(1994: 303). He further states (p. 305): "Kåtyåyana's work proves that there was a close connection between 
the Yajurveda and the Såmaveda (i.e., the Veda to which Jaimini belonged, JB) around the time when the 
[M¥måµsåsËtra] came into being." 
4 Parpola (1981: 172) is yet of the opinion that "m¥måµså discussion involving two opposing protagonists 
were a regular institution of each Vedic school in the SËtra period ... And it is from these discussions that the 
M¥måµsåsËtra has directly grown". 
5 Schwanbeck’s fragment 41; tr. McCrindle 1877: 101. 
6 The Mahåbhårata characterises the Veda (besides many other things and beings) as being sanåtana 
‘eternal(?)’; e.g. Mhbh 1.1.52. 
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presented as new inventions but as eternal truths. But we are entitled to ask what benefit 
these strange doctrines brought with them. What could be the advantage for the Brahmins 
concerned in accepting them?7 
 These three doctrines, most specifically the first of them, have a consequence of 
which the M¥måµsakas themselves were very much aware: since the Veda has no 
beginning in time, none of the events recorded in it can ever have taken place. An event 
must have taken place before it came to be recorded; in the case of the Veda this is 
impossible, for the Veda does not post-date any event.8 This consequence is most 
convenient in the case of Vedic stories and remarks that are totally implausible to begin 
with, but covers quite generally all Vedic statements about what presumably happened in 
the past. This is clear from Íabara(-svåmin)'s observations in his M¥måµsåbhå∑ya, some of 
which we will now consider. 
 Íabara is aware that Vedic myths are occasionally in contradiction with reality as 
we know it. He even provides examples. 'The trees sat down for a sacrificial session', 'The 
snakes sat down for a sacrificial session' and 'The old bull sings mad [songs]', all these 
statements are in contradiction with our experience.9 They are, Íabara explains, not to be 
taken literally. They are there in order to praise the sacrificial activities that are enjoined. 
Similar reasoning applies to all stories [86] in the Veda, to all Vedic myths; all the 
passages that contain them are either arthavåda or mantra, neither of which is to be taken 
literally. 
                                                
7 Cp. Frauwallner 1968: 107: "eine philosophische Lehre [gewinnt] für uns erst Leben und Bedeutung ..., 
wenn wir verstehen, warum sie geschaffen wurde, welche Probleme sie lösen sollte und warum gerade diese 
Lösung gewählt wurde ..." 
8 Cp. Íabara on M¥S 1.1.28 and 31: jananamaraˆavantaß ca vedårthå˙ ßrËyante/ ‘babara˙ pråvåhaˆir 
akåmayata’, ‘kusuruvinda auddålakir akåmayata’ ity evamådaya˙/ uddålakasyåpatyaµ gamyata auddålaki˙/ 
yady evaµ pråg auddålakijanmano nåyaµ grantho bhËtapËrva˙/ evam apy anityatå// ... yac ca pråvåhaˆir iti/ 
tan na/ pravåhaˆasya puru∑asyåsiddhatvån na pravåhaˆasyåpatyaµ pråvåhaˆi˙/ praßabda˙ prakar∑e siddho 
vahatiß ca pråpaˆe/ na tv asya samudåya˙ kvacit siddha˙/ ikåras tu yathaivåpatye siddhas tathå kriyåyåm api 
kartari/ tasmåd ya˙ pravåhayati sa pråvåhaˆi˙/ babara iti ßabdånuk®ti˙/ tena yo nityårthas tam evaitau ßabdau 
vadi∑yata˙/ "[Objection:] Objects are recorded in the Veda that are subject to birth and death. For example: 
‘Babara Pråvåhaˆi (= son of Pravåhaˆa) desired,’ ‘Kusuruvinda Auddålaki (= son of Uddålaka) desired’. 
Auddålaki is understood to be the son of Uddålaka. In that case, this book (i.e., the Veda) [can] not have 
existed prior to the birth of Auddålaki. In this way, too, [the Veda must be] non-eternal. ... [Reply:] What [has 
been said] with regard to Pråvåhaˆi is not [correct]. Pråvåhaˆi is not the son of Pravåhaˆa, because no such 
man [called] Pravåhaˆa is known [to have existed]. The linguistic element pra is known as signifying 
‘excellence’, and [the verbal root] vah as signifying ‘conveying’. But its combination is not known to signify 
anything. The sound i [in pråvåhaˆi], on the other hand, is known to signify ‘son of’ as well as the agent of an 
activity. For that reason pråvåhaˆi means ‘that which carries in an excellent manner’. Babara imitates the 
sound [of wind (?)]. Therefore these two words (babara and pråvåhaˆi) will refer to something eternal." The 
two quotations occur at TaitS 7.1.10.2 and 7.2.2.1 respectively. 
9 Íabara on M¥S 1.1.32: vanaspataya˙ sattram åsata; sarpå˙ sattram åsata; jaradgavo gåyati mattakåni. None 
of these three citations seems traceable in the Veda as we know it. 
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 These and similar remarks deny the validity of all Vedic myths. None are to be 
taken literally, all of them have only one function, viz. to encourage, or discourage, people 
to carry out certain actions. But not only myths are discarded. Íabara goes further, and 
reduces the deities, presumably the recipients of the sacrifices that must be carried out, to 
mere names that possess no power and have no anthropomorphic features. His Bhå∑ya on 
M¥måµsåsËtra 9.1.9, for example, argues in detail against the notion that deities have 
bodies and eat. On M¥måµsåsËtra 10.4.23, having first rejected the proposal that deities are 
the beings living in heaven that are described in traditional stories of the type itihåsa and 
puråˆa, he goes as far as to agree that deities may be nothing but words: 'This [position, 
according to which deities are nothing but words,] will not be refuted by us, for this 
[position], when expressed, is not in conflict with our view.'10 
 It will be clear that Íabara discards here, in one fell swoop, all contents of the Veda. 
The only exceptions are the injunctions, because these cannot be in conflict with other 
sources of information (Bronkhorst 1997: 367-368; cp. Devasthali 1959: 15). But what 
could be the point of discarding the contents of the literary corpus which the Brahmins, 
including the M¥måµsakas, make such a major effort to preserve? 
 Two possible answers come to mind. The first is as follows. The religious 
convictions of the Vedic Brahmins are likely to have changed profoundly since Vedic 
times, so much so that the contents of the Veda no longer agreed with the beliefs they 
actually held. M¥måµså philosophy offered an elegant way out: the Brahmins could 
henceforth reject the conceptual side of Vedic religion while remaining guardians of the 
Veda and continuing Vedic ritual, thus illustrating the observation that ritual traditions can 
be far more persistent than belief systems (Staal 1985). Unfortunately there is little textual 
evidence to support this position. It is no doubt significant and in any case highly 
suggestive that the M¥måµsaka Kumårila Bha††a (7th cent. C.E.) begins his Ílokavårttika 
with a dedicatory stanza to Íiva.11 It may be no less significant that his commentator 
Pårthasårathi Mißra makes an attempt to explain this away.12 
[87] 
                                                
10 Íabara on M¥S 10.4.23: nanv evaµ ßabda eva devatå pråpnoti/ atrocyate/ naitad asmåbhi˙ parihartavyam/ 
na h¥dam ucyamånam asmatpak∑aµ bådhate/. 
11 Ílokavårttika, Pratijñådhikaraˆa 1: vißuddhajñånadehåya trived¥divyacak∑u∑e/ ßreya˙pråptinimittåya 
nama˙ somårdhadhåriˆe//. There are further indications suggesting that Kumårila may have been concerned to 
integrate "Hinduistic" elements, such as his acceptance of the idea of liberation (see Mesquita 1994; there is 
no reason to think that earlier M¥måµsakas had accepted this idea, cf. Bronkhorst 2000: 100). See further 
below. 
12 Cp. Biardeau 1964: 145: "Est-ce ... que la M¥måµså épuise la croyance religieuse des brahmanes qui 
l'enseignent ou qu'elle l'ait jamais épuisée? Pour l'époque contemporaine, il est certain que non: les rares 
M¥måµsaka d'aujourd'hui se disent généralement smårta et se rattachent donc aux disciples de Íankara." 
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 There is another possible reason why the M¥måµsakas explicitly rejected the 
contents of the very texts whose guardians they were. To appreciate it one should recall that 
early in the first millennium C.E. (or even earlier) a tradition of rational debate had 
established itself in India which came to exert a determining influence on the development 
of speculative thought. It is not at all clear why and how, and even when exactly, this 
tradition made its appearance, but once it had appeared, Indian philosophy was never to be 
the same again; it might even be argued that this tradition allowed classical Indian 
philosophy to come into existence. Thinkers, it appears, were henceforth obliged to defend 
their positions against the attacks of outsiders who felt no sympathy for them, and victory 
in the debates that took place was apparently considered so important that participants 
modified their positions where necessary so as to make them more coherent and therefore 
more defensible. The challenges resulting from these confrontations are responsible for 
much of what might be called the history of Indian philosophy: positions were polished and 
improved, new ideas introduced, arguments analysed and sharpened. 
 This development did not affect all those who held views and opinions. The 
mathematical sciences were not affected until late (Bronkhorst forthcoming). In philosophy 
itself it appears that Jainism joined the debate rather late, and Kashmir Íaivism only did so 
almost a millennium after its initiation. Others may have avoided these debates. Many 
sacrificing Brahmins may have belonged to this category. They adhered to their traditions, 
which they did not need to defend, at least not in debates, and continued as much as 
possible as before. They had no need for verbal confrontations with outsiders, nor indeed 
for the systematizations of M¥måµså. 
 However, sacrificing Brahmins, too, needed royal support, which may occasionally 
have been contingent upon their skill in defending their positions in confrontations with 
others, at the royal court or elsewhere. Circumstances of this kind may account for the fact 
that a number of sacrificing Brahmins joined the tradition of critical debate. This involved 
exposing themselves to often severe criticism from unsympathetic outsiders. The outsiders 
concerned were first of all, no doubt, Buddhists, very active participants in the debates of 
that early period; Buddhists may indeed have played a major role in establishing the 
tradition of critical debate (cf. Bronkhorst 1999). What would those Buddhists criticize 
above all in conservative Brahmins who spent their lives reciting the Veda and carrying out 
complicated rites? Primarily, one would think, the contents of the Veda. The Vedic 
Brahmins, whether they liked it or not, could in this way be held accountable for myths that 
were often highly improbable and which they themselves may have long since ceased to 
take seriously. And yet, the Brahmins would not be able to reject [88] these myths without 
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damaging their own credibility. Once again, the M¥måµså philosophy offered a way out. 
The Brahmins who adopted this philosophy did not believe these myths, to be sure. The 
reason was not however that they were lax, or ignorant about their own tradition, nor that 
their attachment to the Veda was a mere facade; quite the opposite, they did not believe 
these myths because they knew, better than their critics, how to interpret the Veda. These 
myths were not meant to be believed, and those who thought otherwise displayed their own 
ignorance in doing so. 
 Seen in this way, M¥måµså as a system of thought owed its origin, at least in part, 
to the need to defend the Vedic tradition against outsiders. The doctrine of the 
beginninglessness of the Veda, along with its corrollary of authorlessness, have as a 
consequence that all but the 'timeless' parts of the Veda do no longer have to be interpreted 
literally. The third fundamental principle of classical M¥måµså, the Veda's self-sufficient 
validity (svata˙pråmåˆya) along with 'proximity' as interpretative principle (Bronkhorst 
1997) was a doctrinal extension guiding the practice of interpretation. If, then, we recall 
that the Veda's beginninglessness (anåditva), authorlessness (apauru∑eyatva) and self-
sufficient validity (svata˙pråmåˆya) constitute the three pillars of classical M¥måµså as a 
system of thought, it can be seen that this whole theoretical construction may find its raison 
d'être in the need to preserve the Vedic way of life — i.e. the sacrificial tradition — without 
being bound by most of the contents of this body of literature. 
 
* * * 
 
What reason is there to think that the traditional Brahmins may have been criticized for the 
myths they presumably believed in? Most of the surviving philosophical discussions of 
classical India concern philosophical problems, and rarely do we come across attacks on 
the personal beliefs of the participants. This, however, may be due to the fact that most of 
the surviving philosophical literature of India dates from a time when the participants in the 
debates had developed a public image far removed from popular beliefs. Yet there are clear 
traces of evidence to show that the Buddhists, at any rate, had been critical of Brahmanical 
myths from an early date onward. We will briefly review the Buddhist criticism of one 
particularly important Brahmanical myth, a myth invoked by the Brahmins to justify their 
division of society into different castes, varˆas, an idea which the Buddhists did not share.13  
                                                
13 Some further texts critical of Brahmanical and Hindu mythology, from the side of Jainas and Buddhists 
respectively, are discussed in Osier 2000 and Masset 2000. 
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 The myth concerned finds its classic, and probably earliest, exposition in the 
Puru∑asËkta of the Ùgveda (RV 10.90), but important parts of it recur in many later [89] 
texts. It recounts how the world and its inhabitants came about as a result of a sacrifice in 
which the primordial giant, Puru∑a, is dismembered. The most important parts for us read, 
in the (slightly adjusted) translation of Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty (1983: 30-31): 
 
The Man has a thousand heads, a thousand eyes, a thousand feet. He pervaded the 
earth on all sides and extended beyond it as far as ten fingers. (1) 
It is the Man who is all this, whatever has been and whatever is to be. He is the ruler 
of immortality, when he grows beyond everything through food. (2) 
... 
When the gods spread the sacrifice with the Man as the offering, spring was the 
clarified butter, summer the fuel, autumn the oblation. (6) 
... 
When they divided the Man, into how many parts did they apportion him? What do 
they call his mouth, his two arms and thighs and feet? (11) 
His mouth became the Brahmin; his arms were made into the Warrior, his thighs the 
Common man, and from his feet the Servant was born. (12) 
 
The hymn to Puru∑a is, in the words of Louis Renou (1965: 8), 'the major source of 
cosmogonic thought in ancient India'; elsewhere he says (1956: 12): 'Il n'y a guère de 
poème cosmologique de l'Atharvaveda où l'on ne retrouve quelque allusion voilée au mythe 
du Géant sacrifié et au schéma évolutif qui en résulte ... C'est encore le thème du Géant qui 
sous les traits de Prajåpati ‘le seigneur des Créatures’ ressurgit dans les Bråhmaˆa et en 
commande la plupart des avenues.' Jan Gonda (1968: 101) calls it 'the foundation stone of 
Vi∑ˆuite philosophy'.14 Especially the part concerning the creation of the four main 
divisions of society, the four varˆas, has been taken over in numerous texts belonging both 
to the Vedic and to the classical period. We find it, for example, in the Taittir¥ya Saµhitå 
(7.1.1.4-6), the Råmåyaˆa (3.13.29-30), but also in the first chapter of the Manu Sm®ti. The 
Lord, we read there, created, 'so that the worlds and people would prosper and increase, 
from his mouth the Brahmin, from his arms the K∑atriya, from his thighs the Vaißya, and 
from his feet the ÍËdra.'15 Elsewhere the same text refers to this myth as common 
background knowledge, and as an alternative way of speaking about the four varˆas.16 
                                                
14 It is open to question to what extent the Puru∑asËkta is representative of Ùgvedic religion; Staal 1995: 30 
calls it 'an atypical, late and isolated composition'. 
15 Manu 1.31: lokånåµ tu viv®ddhyarthaµ mukhabåhËrupådata˙/ bråhmaˆaµ k∑atriyaµ vaißyaµ ßËdraµ ca 
niravartayat//. The translation follows, with modifications, Doniger & Smith 1991. The Bhavi∑ya Puråˆa has 
the same verse (Lásló 1971: 117) 
16 Manu 10.45: mukhabåhËrupajjånåµ yå loke jåtayo bahi˙/ mlecchavåcaß cåryavåca˙ sarve te dasyava˙ 
sm®tå˙//. Tr. Doniger & Smith 1991: 241: "All of those castes who are excluded from the world of those who 
were born from the mouth, arms, thighs, and feet (of the primordial Man) are traditionally regarded as aliens, 
whether they speak barbarian languages or Aryan languages."  




 These and many other references17 to the myth of the Puru∑asËkta do not allow us to 
decide with certainty whether the authors concerned took this myth literally. Modern 
authorities have a tendency to suppose that they did not. Ninian Smart, to mention but one 
example, has the following to say about myths in general and the way they are understood 
in the present and in the past (Smart 1996: 138): 
 
[It] seems ... that we are moving out of the age of what may be called ‘fanciful’ 
myth into that of ‘factual’ myth. I do not mean by this that the more fanciful myths 
have not been believed in some sense to be factual: describing reality. But now there 
is a more earthbound understanding of what is factual. So Adam and Eve have to be 
real persons: or if they are not they have to be symbolic representations of a real 
human condition that can be described metaphysically or existentially. 
 
And again (Smart 1996: 161): 
 
As we move towards another century and into it, the divergence, considered 
phenomenologically, between the old myth and the new history tends to fade away. 
Legends of Moses and Krishna and the Buddha and Confucius tend to solidify. 
Since historicity is regarded as a plus, there is a trend towards thinking of the 
legendary as historically real. In any case, it becomes a problem to distinguish 
between the two. 
 
These passages suggest that, at least according to Smart, there was a time when myths were 
not understood to be true in an earthbound factual manner, not historically real. 
Unfortunately he does not elaborate or clarify this suggestion, and nor does he give any 
specification as to the date or period during which the important change referred to in these 
passages has taken place. Moreover, no attempt is made to explain why such a change 
should take place. What is it exactly that pushes 'us' to change our understanding of myths? 
Are we here presented with a new variant of the now-to-be-discarded distinction between 
mythical, i.e. pre-logical, and logical thought? If so, some clarifications would have been 
useful. 
 Whatever modern authorities may have to say about the question, there is evidence 
that Indian thinkers, or at least some of them, did take the myth of the creation of the four 
varˆas out of the initial giant quite seriously, i.e. literally — as being literally true. Part of 
the story is retold in the Padårthadharmasaµgraha, also known as Praßastapådabhå∑ya, 
                                                
17 For a discussion of the importance of the Puru∑a-sËkta in later literature and practice, see Shende 1965; 
Gonda 1977: 98-105 (390-397). 
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which is the classical surviving treatise of the Vaiße∑ika philosophy, written by Praßasta, 
alias Praßastapåda. The passage concerned reads:18 
 
When in this way the four composite elements have come into existence, a great egg 
(mahad aˆ∂am) is formed, caused solely by God's (maheßvara) meditation / volition 
(abhidhyåna), out of atoms of fire with an admixture of atoms of earth (i.e., gold). In 
it [God] creates Brahmå, with four faces like so many lotuses, the grandfather of all 
worlds (sarvalokapitåmahaµ brahmåˆam), and all worlds; he then enjoins him with 
the duty of creating living things. That Brahmå, thus enjoined by God, and endowed 
[91] with abundant knowledge, complete absence of passion and absolute power, 
knows the effects of the deeds of living beings; he creates the Prajåpatis, his mind-
created (månasa) sons, with knowledge, experience and span of life in accordance 
with their [past] deeds; [he also creates] the Manus, Devas, Ù∑is and groups of Pit®s 
(pit®gaˆa), the four varˆas out of his mouth,  arms, thighs and feet 
(mukhabåhËrupådata˙)  [respectively], and the other living beings, high and 
low (uccåvacåni bhËtåni); he then connects them with dharma, knowledge, absence 
of passion and power in accordance with their residue of past deeds. 
 
In order to correctly evaluate this passage, it is important to realize that the 
Padårthadharmasaµgraha is no book of stories and myths, nor is it meant to be read as 
literature. On the contrary, it is a very serious treatise about the constitution of reality, of 
which it presents a coherent and systematic explanation. It is out of the question to read any 
passage of this serious work, including the one just cited, as not intending to convey reality, 
and convey it, not in any metaphorical, but in a most literal manner. It is true that the 
contents of this passage may not have been part of the Vaiße∑ika philosophy during the time 
preceding Praßasta. There are reasons to believe that the very notion of a creator God may 
have been introduced into the system by this author, and that he borrowed this notion from 
the religious current to which he may have belonged, that of the Påßupatas. This does not, 
however, mean that this notion is to be taken less seriously than the remainder of the 
Padårthadharmasaµgraha.19 
 The explicit mention of the creation of the four varˆas out of the mouth, arms, 
thighs and feet of the creator in a work as serious and reality-oriented as Praßasta's 
                                                
18 WI p. 11: evaµ samutpanne∑u catur∑u mahåbhËte∑u maheßvarasyåbhidhyånamåtråt taijasebhyo 'ˆubhya˙ 
pårthivaparamåˆusahitebhyo (variants: pårthivådiparamåˆusahitebhyo, pårthivåˆusahitebhyo) mahad aˆ∂am 
årabhyate (some editions read utpadyate)/ tasmiµß caturvadanakamalaµ sarvalokapitåmahaµ (variant: 
caturvadanakamalasakalalokapitåmahaµ) brahmåˆaµ sakalabhuvanasahitam utpådya prajåsarge viniyu∫kte 
(variant: niyu∫kte)/ sa ca maheßvareˆa viniyukto (variant: niyukto) brahmå 
'tißayajñånavairågyaißvaryasampanna˙ pråˆinåµ (variant: sarvapråˆinåµ) karmavipåkaµ viditvå 
karmånurËpajñånabhogåyu∑a˙ sutån prajåpat¥n månasån manudevar∑ipit®gaˆån (variant: manËn deva°) 
mukhabåhËrupådataß caturo varˆån anyåni coccåvacåni bhËtåni (variants: bhËtåni ca; anyåni 
coccåvacåni ca s®∑†vå) s®∑†vå, åßayånurËpair dharmajñånavairågyaißvaryai˙ saµyojayat¥ti//.  
19 On the philosophical reasons underlying the introduction of the notion of a creator God into Vaiße∑ika, see 
Bronkhorst 2000: § 7, esp. p. 37 f.; further Bronkhorst 1996. 
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Padårthadharmasaµgraha shows that at least one participant in the tradition of critical 
reflection accepted this myth as literally true. It seems likely that many other Brahmanical 
intellectuals of that period did the same. 
 As stated above, the Buddhists rejected the fourfold division of human beings, and 
also rejected the myth that was meant to lend credence to it. A number of Buddhist authors 
criticize the very same myth which Praßasta (and probably many others with him) explicitly 
accepted, the myth that the four varˆas were originally [92] created out of the mouth, arms, 
thighs and feet of the original being. They do so by showing that it is incoherent, in that it 
has implications which even the Brahmins would be loath to accept.20 
 We already find such criticism in the Aggañña Sutta of the D¥gha Nikåya. The 
Brahmin Våse††ha here reports the position of his fellow-Brahmins, according to whom 
'only the Brahmins are the real sons of Brahmå, born from his mouth, born from Brahmå, 
produced by Brahmå, heirs of Brahmå'.21 The Buddha responds that they maintain this 
position, 'forgetting what is old' (poråˆaµ assarantå). This expression has been variously 
interpreted by the commentators: some speak of an old tradition,22 others of ancient 
history.23 The context, however, favours a third interpretation: these Brahmins forget the 
past, that is to say the relatively recent past of their own birth. This is shown by what 
follows.24 According to the Buddha it is undeniable that the wives of Brahmins 
(bråhmaˆånaµ bråhmaˆiyo) have their periods, become pregnant, give birth and feed; in 
spite of being thus born from a human womb, the Brahmins maintain that they are born 
from Brahmå.25 In doing so, these Brahmins insult (abbhåcikkhanti) Brahmå.26 This 
criticism is obviously based on the most literal interpretation of the Brahmanical myth. The 
claim of the Brahmins to have been born from Brahmå is in conflict with their birth from a 
human mother. In other words, the Brahmins are credited with the belief of their birth, at 
the beginning of their present life, from the mouth of Brahmå. 
                                                
20 Vincent Eltschinger's recent book (2000) has been particularly helpful in writing the following paragraphs. 
See further Renou 1960: 43. 
21 DN III.81: bråhmaˆå va Brahmuno puttå oraså mukhato jåtå Brahma-jå Brahma-nimmitå Brahma-dåyådå. 
Cp. Meisig 1988: 80 f. for the Chinese parallels. 
22 Walshe 1987: 408 ("ancient tradition"); Rhys Davids 1921: 78 ("ancient lore"). 
23 Sv III p. 862: poråˆan ti poråˆakaµ aggaññaµ lok'uppattiµ cariya-vaµsam; Franke 1913: 275 ("es ist 
nicht uralte Erinnerung an eine wirkliche Tatsache"). 
24 The following remarks also occur in the Assalåyana Sutta (MN II.148). 
25 DN III.81-82: dissanti kho pana Våse††ha bråhmaˆånaµ bråhmaˆiyo utuniyo pi gabbhiniyo pi vijåyamånå 
pi påyamånå pi, te ca bråhmaˆa yonijå va samånå evam åhaµsu: bråhmaˆå va ... Brahmuno puttå oraså 
mukhato jåtå Brahma-jå Brahma-nimmitå Brahma-dåyådå. Cp. Meisig 1988: 86 f. 
26 This last remark does not occur in the Assalåyana Sutta. 
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 The VajrasËc¥ proceeds in a similar manner. Here the following argument is 
found:27 'There is another defect [in your proposition]. If the Brahmin is born from the 
mouth, where is the Brahmin woman born from? Certainly from the mouth. Alas! Then she 
is your sister! So, you do not regard the convention of licit and illicit sexual intercourse! 
But that is extremely repugnant to the people of this world.' 
[93] 
 The ÍårdËlakarˆåvadåna states essentially the same point:28 'If this world has been 
created by Brahmå himself, the Brahmin woman is the sister of the Brahmin, the K∑atriya 
woman the sister of the K∑atriya, the Vaißya woman [the sister] of the Vaißya, or the ÍËdra 
woman [the sister] of the ÍËdra; if she has been created by Brahmå, [a woman of the same 
caste], being a sister [of her husband], she will not be a suitable wife.' 
 This is not the place to investigate how the Vaiße∑ikas answered, or might have 
answered, the criticism of the Buddhists. It must here be sufficient to note that the three 
classical commentaries on Praßasta's Padårthadharmasaµgraha — the Vyomavat¥, the 
Nyåyakandal¥, and the Kiraˆåval¥ — devote long discussions in this connection to the 
question of the existence of a creator God, but fail to say a word about how this particular 
myth is to be interpreted so as to avoid contradictions. The discussion stays on a highly 
abstract, 'philosophical', level, where inferences and logical analyses have their place. The 
details of the myth, on the other hand, do not receive attention. 
 Perhaps the authors of the Vyomavat¥, the Nyåyakandal¥, and the Kiraˆåval¥ were 
right in ignoring the tricky challenge posed by the Buddhists. Their task would certainly 
have been difficult. The position of the M¥måµsakas, on the other hand, was simple and 
straightforward. They, the guardians of the Veda, made no effort whatsoever to justify the 
historical contents of this corpus, because they denied its accuracy. Not only the 
Puru∑asËkta, but any historical event seemingly described in the Veda was to be interpreted 
differently, so as to lose all the historical content it might have seemed to possess. The 
criticisms uttered by the Buddhists constituted no threat to the M¥måµsakas. 
 
* * * 
 
                                                
27 VajrasËc¥, ed. Weber p. 225 l. 6-8; ed. Mukhopadhyaya p. 9 [JJ]: anyac ca dË∑aˆaµ bhavati/ yadi mukhato 
jåto bråhmaˆo bråhmaˆyå˙ kuta utpatti˙/ mukhåd eveti cet hanta tarhi bhavatåµ bhagin¥prasa∫ga˙ syåt/ tathå 
gamyågamyaµ na sambhåvyate/ tac ca loke 'tyantaviruddham/. Tr. Mukhopadhyaya 1960: 20. 
28 Divy(V) no. 33 verses 76-77, p. 332: yadi tåvad ayaµ loko brahmaˆå janita˙ svayam/ bråhmaˆ¥ 
bråhmaˆasvaså k∑atriyå k∑atriyasvaså// atha vaißyasya vaißyå vai ßËdrå ßËdrasya vå puna˙/ na bhåryå bhagin¥ 
yuktå brahmaˆå janitå yadi// 
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It will be clear that the above mentioned three doctrines of the beginninglessness 
(anåditva), authorlessness (apauru∑eyatva) and self-sufficient validity (svata˙pråmåˆya) of 
the Veda constituted a wonderful protection for Brahmins confronted with outsiders intent 
on making fun of the Veda. The introduction and elaboration of these elements — it would 
appear — turned a school of Vedic interpretation into a school of thought based on a 
coherent vision of the unique position of the Veda in the world. Do we know when these 
changes took place? 
[94] 
 Some sËtras of the present M¥måµsåsËtra support the idea of apauru∑eyatva and its 
consequences, at least in the interpretation of Íabara. Francis X. Clooney (1990: 51) agrees, 
and points out that 'apauru∑eyatva finds its roots, through (sic; this must no doubt be 
though) not explicit mention, in Jaimini's text'. Without saying as much, he probably thinks 
here of sËtras 1.1.27-32, which he translates as follows (p. 166-167): 
 
1.1.27 vedåµß caike saµnikar∑aµ puru∑åkhyå˙/  
 Some people say that the Vedas are similarly [i.e. like sentences in the 
ordinary world, JB] composed (saµnikar∑a) because they are named after 
persons. 
1.1.28 anityadarßanåc ca/  
 Also, because we find ephemeral things (mentioned in the Veda). 
1.1.29 uktaµ tu ßabdapËrvatvam/  
 But we have already explained that the word is prior (to usage: 
ßabdapËrvatvam). 
1.1.30 åkhyå pravacanåt/  
 The names (connected with various texts) are due to expounding (and not 
due to composing) the texts. 
1.1.31 paraµ tu ßrutisåmånyamåtram/  
 In regard to the latter argument (28), there is merely a similarity of sounds 
(ßrutisåmånyamåtram). 
1.1.32 k®te vå viniyoga˙ syåt karmaˆa˙ sambandhåt/ 
 (In contrast with the words of ordinary language, Vedic words) apply to 
what has been accomplished; for words are thus related to action. 
 
Íabara and Clooney may be right in their interpretation of these sËtras. If so, we must 
conclude that two of the above-mentioned three elements — anåditva and apauru∑eyatva, 
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along with their consequences — were not introduced by Íabara, but well before him. We 
cannot however conclude with certainty that the notion of apauru∑eyatva, along with the 
consequences which the M¥måµså draws from it, already existed at the time of, and found 
expression in, the hypothetical original M¥måµsåsËtra, the source of the more recent 
PËrva- and Uttara-m¥måµsåsËtras. As already observed by Parpola (1981: 151-152) and 
others before him, it seems certain that the M¥måµsåsËtra as we have it contains 
interpolated passages.  
 At this point we must try to refine our understanding of the idea of a Veda without 
beginning and its consequences. The idea that the Veda is eternal in itself appears to be old, 
and may have also been current in other circles than only those of the early M¥måµsakas. 
Early (and datable) evidence occurs in the Mahåbhå∑ya of Patañjali, which may convey a 
reliable impression of the way in which at least some Brahmins thought about this issue in 
the second century preceding the common era:29 'Has it not been stated that Vedic texts are 
not made, that Vedic texts are eternal? [True, but] even though their meaning is eternal, the 
sequence of their sounds is not eternal. [95] It is on account of that difference that we have 
[different recensions of the Veda, such as] the Kå†haka, the Kålåpaka, the Maudaka, the 
Paippalådaka.' Here the idea of an eternal Veda is present, but interpreted in a way which 
renders it relatively harmless. 
 There is another way in which the idea of an eternal Veda can be deprived of its 
most disturbing aspects, and it appears that many orthodox thinkers — with the exception 
of the M¥måµsakas, of course — resorted to it. A beginningless Veda was conceived of as 
existing in and alongside a world which passes through cycles of creation and destruction 
without beginning or end.30 The eternal Veda was believed to be reintroduced after each 
renewed creation, exactly in the same shape as before. The advantage of this model would 
be that the Veda, although without beginning, might yet contain information about the 
world, for the simple reason that the world infinitely repeats itself from beginningless time. 
We find this position, for example, in the first chapter of the Manusm®ti where it describes 
how Brahmå milked the triple eternal Veda out of fire, wind and the sun.31 It seems that this 
is the position taken in the Uttaram¥måµsåsËtra and later Vedånta. Uttaram¥måµsåsËtra 
1.3.29 and 30 (as interpreted by Ía∫kara) maintain that the Veda is eternal. SËtra 1.1.2 
                                                
29 Mahå-bh II p. 315 l. 13-15 (on P. 4.3.101 vt. 3): nanu coktaµ na hi cchandåµsi kriyante nityåni 
cchandåµs¥ti/ yady apy artho nityo yå tv asau varˆånupËrv¥ sånityå/ tadbhedåc caitad bhavati kå†hakaµ 
kålåpakaµ maudakaµ paippalådakam iti/ 
30 Note that Kumårila (TanVår on sËtra 1.3.7, p. 122 f.) is not averse to the idea of world periods. 
31 Manu 1.23a-c: agnivåyuravibhyas tu trayaµ brahma sanåtanam/ dudoha ... Kane, HistDh II p. 352 claims 
that "[a]ll dharmaßåstra writers proceed on this axiom of the eternity of the Veda", without however giving 
references in support of this.  
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informs us that the world is periodically recreated. SËtra 1.3.28 (as interpreted by Ía∫kara) 
adds that the world arises out of the Vedic word.32  
 A particularly clear description of this Vedånta position occurs in the much later 
Vedåntaparibhå∑å. It reads as follows:33 
 
The M¥måµsakas who occupy themselves with the sacrifice (i.e. the PËrva-
M¥måµsakas) maintain that the Vedas are valid because they are eternal and 
therefore free from all human faults. In our opinion (i.e., that of the Vedåntins), on 
the other hand, the Veda is not eternal, because it has an origin. 
[Objection:] The fact that the Vedas have an origin and have been made by God 
proves that they have an author; such being the case, your position according to 
which the Vedas have no author is shown to be incorrect. 
[Reply:] Not so, for 'having an author' does not, to begin with, mean 'being uttered 
by a person'. Nor does it mean 'having an origin that depends on a person'. 
To explain: at the beginning of creation God made the Veda in such a way that its 
composition is identical to the composition of the Veda established during the 
previous [96] creation, not a different Veda. The Vedas have, as a result, no author 
in the sense that they are not the object of an utterance that is independent of a 
similar utterance (made during an earlier creation). The utterance of the 
Mahåbhårata etc., on the other hand, is  independent of a similar utterance (during an 
earlier creation), and therefore these texts do have an author. In this way tradition 
has been defined as being divided into parts that have and those that do not have an 
author. 
 
 It appears, then, that the idea of a beginningless Veda (and perhaps even that of an 
authorless Veda) may not have been an invention of early M¥måµså. However, only the 
M¥måµsakas (and this does not include the Vedåntins) drew from it the far-reaching 
conclusions which turned their school into an impenetrable bastion for those defenders of 
the Veda who did not wish to identify with its myths. Who did so, and when, remains 
obscure. Why they did so may have become clearer after the preceding reflections. 
 With regard to the introduction of the third element, the self-sufficient validity of 
the Veda (svata˙pråmåˆya), we are on firmer ground. Erich Frauwallner (1968: 107 ff.) has 
adduced convincing reasons to show that this doctrine was created by the so-called 
V®ttikåra, the anonymous author a long passage of whose work is cited in Íabara's Bhå∑ya 
                                                
32 Ía∫kara explains the words ata˙ prabhavåt of sËtra 1.3.28 with the words: ata eva hi vaidikåc chabdåd 
devådikaµ jagat prabhavati. 
33 Text and translation as in Bronkhorst 1998: 12-13: vedånåµ nityatvena nirastasamastapuµdË∑aˆatayå 
pråmåˆyam ity adhvaram¥måµsakå˙/ asmåkaµ tu mate vedo na nitya˙ utpattimattvåt/ .../ nanu ... 
utpattimattvena parameßvarakart®katayå pauru∑eyatvasiddhau apauru∑eyatvaµ vedånåm iti tavåpi siddhånto 
bhajyeta/ iti cet na/ na hi tåvat puru∑eˆa uccåryamåˆatvaµ pauru∑eyatvam/ ... nåpi puru∑ådh¥notpattikatvaµ 
[pauru∑eyatvam]/ ... kiµtu sajåt¥yoccåraˆånapek∑occåraˆavi∑ayatvaµ pauru∑eyetvam/ tathå ca sargådyakåle 
parameßvara˙ pËrvasargasiddhavedånupËrv¥samånånupËrv¥kaµ vedaµ viracitavån/ na tu tadvijåt¥yaµ vedam/ 
iti na sajåt¥yoccåraˆånapek∑occåraˆavi∑ayatvaµ pauru∑eyatvaµ [vedånåm]/ [mahå]bhåratåd¥nåµ tu 
sajåt¥yoccåraˆam anapek∑yaivoccåraˆam iti te∑åµ pauru∑eyatvam/ evaµ pauru∑eyåpauru∑eyabhedena ågamo 
dvividho nirËpita˙/. I translate pauru∑eya with "having an author". 
The origin of M¥måµså  15 
 
 
on sËtras 1.1.4-5. Not only does the V®ttikåra explain this doctrine in the passage 
concerned,34 but there are various indications to show that he introduced this doctrine as a 
novelty. In view of what has been said earlier in this article, it is significant to note that this 
V®ttikåra is very much concerned, and involved in a debate, with Buddhist positions. 
 
* * * 
 
Summarising the reflections presented so far, it seems likely that M¥måµså — that is to say 
PËrvam¥måµså, i.e., that which finds expression in the PËrvam¥måµsåsËtra and its 
commentaries — underwent an important modification, and became more than before a 
'school of thought', through the introduction and elaboration of three doctrinal elements: the 
claimed beginninglessness (anåditva), authorlessness (apauru∑eyatva) [97] and self-
sufficient validity (svata˙pråmåˆya) of the Veda. It seems likely that this modification took 
place in two steps, presumably connected with two persons: the author of M¥måµsåsËtra 
1.1.27-32, and the V®ttikåra cited by Íabara respectively. Together these modifications 
provided M¥måµså with a global, overarching and coherent vision. This vision is unique in 
the sense that it is radically different from anything else produced by Indian philosophers,35 
and even from the Vedic thought which this school is supposed to represent and continue. 
The reasons for the creation of such an extraordinary system of thought — even by 
contemporary Indian standards — must be sought in the particular circumstances and 
challenges that accompanied its beginnings. We know little about the beginning of 
M¥måµså as a system of thought but for the fact that it must have occurred when a tradition 
of rational debate and criticism had established itself in India, a tradition which came to 
determine the shape and development of the main schools of philosophy. All schools that 
participated in this tradition had to make sure that their systems were coherent and 
defensible in debates with unfriendly critics. M¥måµså in its new garb was coherent and 
eminently defensible. Even its Achilles heel — the obligation to defend the Veda and 
therefore its contents, including the many improbable stories it contains — had been 
properly taken care of: M¥måµså after its transformation had no longer to defend anything 
found in the Veda except for its injunctions, for it had effectively discarded everything else. 
 
* * * 
                                                
34 For text and translation, see Frauwallner 1968: 24 ff. 
35 The Såµkhya philosopher called Mådhava must here be mentioned, who, for theoretical reasons, appears 
to have rejected the idea of world periods followed by renewed creation; cf. Bronkhorst 2000: 61. 




Having discussed the origin of M¥måµså as a school of thought, I add a few provisional 
remarks, not about its end, but about the end of the circumstances that gave rise to it. I have 
suggested that the presence of unfriendly critics, along with the wish or obligation to listen 
to their criticisms, were responsible for the systematisations resulting in ‘M¥måµså as a 
school of thought’. Among these critics the Buddhists played a particularly important role. 
Buddhism, however, was in serious decline in the seventh century of the common era. 
Chinese pilgrims inform us that Buddhist monasteries were largely deserted, a development 
which went hand in hand with an increase in the number of Hindu temples (‘Deva-
temples’).36 In other words, the most redoubtable critics of Brahmanical orthodoxy were 
losing their position in society, and their criticism — whatever the logical value of their 
arguments [98] — no longer constituted the threat it once had. What would be the effect on 
a school like M¥måµså? 
 Our attention is inevitably drawn to Kumårila Bha††a, influential M¥måµså author 
of the seventh century. In another study (Bronkhorst 2000: § 13) I have pointed out that 
Íabara appears to have made an effort to conceptualise the mechanism of karmic 
retribution by reducing all the relevant elements of the sacrifice (the sacrifice itself, its 
result: heaven, the gods) to mental entities. Kumårila, on the other hand, did not do so, 
leaving karmic retribution essentially unexplained. Is it possible that Íabara, under the 
perceived pressure of Buddhist critics, felt obliged to offer explanations where Kumårila, 
no longer under threat, could do without? 
 Another feature deserves attention. Early ‘philosophical’ M¥måµså was primarily 
concerned with the validity of the Veda. This does not mean that it was uninterested in non-
Vedic texts, texts composed by human authors. A few sËtras deal with the validity of the 
Sm®ti, and Íabara's discussion shows that injunctions — presumably occurring in Kalpa 
SËtras and the like — are at stake.37 Such injunctions are valid if they concern invisible 
things and are not in contradiction with the Veda; it must indeed be inferred that they are 
based on Vedic texts that may have been lost. Other injunctions in the Sm®ti are valid 
because they serve a useful purpose.38 Kumårila extends the list of valid texts to include the 
                                                
36 Eltschinger 1999, which is in this respect based on Joshi 1967, chapter XII; the Chinese pilgrims are 
primarily Hsüan-tsang and I-ching, among others. 
37 Agrawal 1985: 25 traces Íabara's quotation a∑†akå˙ kartavyå˙ to Óßvalåyana G®hyasËtra 2.4.1; gurur 
anugantavya˙ to Vasi∑†hasm®ti 8.9; ta∂ågaµ khanitavyam to Manusm®ti 8.264; prapå pravartayitavyå to 
Vasi∑†hasm®ti 2.38; ßikhåkarma kartavyam to Våråha G®hyasËtra 4.24; audumbaryå˙ sarvave∑†anam to 
Lå†yåyana ÍrautasËtra 2.6.2; a∑†åcatvåriµßad var∑åˆi vedabrahmacaryacaraˆam to Gautama DharmasËtra 
1.2.51-53; kr¥taråjako (')bhojyånna˙ to Bharadvåja ÍrautasËtra 10.9.3.4. See however Garge 1952: 245-246; 
248-249. 
38 Íabara on sËtras 1.3.1-4. Cf. Kane, HistDh III p. 827 f.; V p. 1260 f. 
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Vedå∫gas, in particular, all of which are, at least in part, based on Vedic texts.39 Even the 
sciences of reasoning (tarkaßåstra) are born from worldly experience, arthavådas and 
Upani∑ads (lokårthavådopani∑atprasËta), whatever that may precisely mean. More 
important are his remarks elsewhere to the effect that the epics and Puråˆas (?; Kumårila 
says bhåratådi ‘the Bhårata etc.’ and mentions the authors ‘Vålm¥ki, Dvaipåyana, etc.’), 
though of human origin, are to be interpreted like the Veda, i.e. in M¥måµså fashion.40 We 
find indeed that Dharmaßåstra commentators — among them Kumårila's contemporary 
Bhåruci41 — start to use M¥måµså methods in interpreting their Sm®ti [99] texts.42 Treating 
Sm®ti texts like the Veda implies, among other things, accepting their prescriptions without 
needing to justify them,43 or to worry about the intentions of their authors.44 Bhåruci's way 
of interpreting the Manusm®ti illustrates this. Not only does he account for every statement 
in the Manusm®ti as being vidhi, niyama, parisaµkhyå or arthavåda (Derrett 1975: I: 25), as 
would a M¥måµsaka when dealing with a Vedic text, but also no reasons are given to 
justify the contents of those statements. What is more, passages where Manu himself gives 
reasons embarrass the commentator. Rather than taking them as reasons, Bhåruci sees them 
as arthavådas, ‘whereupon they cease to embarrass’ (Derrett 1975: I: 27).45 An example is 
Manu 11.12(13): ‘He may take three or two things at his pleasure from the dwelling of a 
                                                
39 TanVår on sËtra 1.3.2, p. 79-80. Cf. Ayyar 1952: 43 f.; Jhå 1903: 119 f. 
40 TanVår on sËtra 1.2.7, p. 14 l. 20 - p. 15 l.13. Cf. Eltschinger 1999; Ayyar 1952: 40 f.; Jhå 1903: 25 f. 
41 Derrett 1975: I: 14 proposes ‘between A.D. 600 and 650’ as ‘conservative’ dates for this author. Derrett 
1973: 15 mentions Bhåruci's Vivaraˆa on the Manusm®ti, VißvarËpa's Bålakr¥∂å on the Yåjñavalkyasm®ti and 
Maskarin's bhå∑ya on the Gautama DharmasËtra as constituting the earliest group of commentaries in 
Dharmaßåstra, all of which must have been composed before the end of the seventh century. 
42 It seems that the importance of M¥måµså in earlier Dharmaßåstra is sometimes exaggerated. Lingat 1973: 
148 (similarly Keith 1921: 97) writes: ‘Vasi∑†ha (III.20), Baudhåyana (I.1.1.8), and Manu (XII.111) call a 
m¥måµsaka to sit in the pari∑ads which are given the role of resolving controversial questions. It seems that 
very early the M¥måµså was regarded as an indispensable science for the interpreter.’ None of these passages 
uses the term m¥måµsaka. Manu 12.111, for example, has the word tark¥ which some later commentators — 
but not Bhåruci and Medhåtithi, the earliest ones — associate with M¥måµså. The fact that the Yåjñavalkya 
Sm®ti (1.3) ranks the M¥måµså amongst the bases (sthåna) of the knowledge of dharma, along with Nyåya 
and the Vedå∫gas, does not at all need to imply that M¥måµså is to be used in interpreting Dharmaßåstra texts 
(such as the Yåjñavalkya Sm®ti itself). 
43 Cp. Lingat 1973: 107: ‘In [the time of the commentators] the human origin of [the dharma-ßåstras] had ... 
been completely obliterated. It was an article of faith that the precepts which they contained derived from 
Sages of the remotest antiquity, and their authority was accordingly beyond dispute. They appeared as if they 
were scripture, timeless, eternal; the whole of them, along with the epics and the puråˆas, brought to men the 
voice of a tradition which was both holy and in conformity with the order of nature. The commentators and 
authors of juridical treatises could not imagine their role as anything other than that of interpreters, concerned 
only to explain the meaning of texts whose authenticity and religious importance they did not doubt for one 
moment.’ 
44 On Medhåtithi’s ideas about the role of Manu, see Wezler 1998. 
45 For the way reasons are dealt with, see further Lingat 1973: 154 f. 
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ÍËdra [for the success of the sacrifice], for the ÍËdra has no business with sacrifices.’46 The 
second half of this verse would seem to give a reason for the first half, but Bhåruci explains 
it otherwise: it is an arthavåda. Still on the same verse, Bhåruci points out that Manu 
elsewhere forbids asking property from a ÍËdra for a sacrifice, and obviously anticipates 
surprise that one can take what one cannot ask for. His response: ‘There is nothing which is 
too heavy for a text, for our ßåstra is concerned to teach us.’47 Derrett explains in a note: ‘It 
seems unreasonable that a ÍËdra's property should be forbidden if it is asked for, but 
suitable if purloined. But if that is what the text requires, we must accept it.’ 
[100] 
 If then, as was argued above, ‘philosophical’ M¥måµså developed its views and 
methods in order to defend its ‘way of life’ against unfriendly critics, these same views and 
methods came to play an altogether different role by the time the unfriendliest of critics, the 
Buddhists, were losing influence. They became a way of (and an excuse for) explaining all 
traditional texts without ever needing to look for justifications. In this way the whole of 
traditional literature was excluded from critical debate, and the question whether this or that 
aspect of it could stand up to criticism lost its importance. M¥måµså thus came to 
contribute, not so much to the preservation of Vedic sacrificial activities, as to ‘the myth 
that all norms emanated from a superhuman source’ and to the assumption ‘that innovation 
was decay, and that change must be, not merely for the worse, but an infringement of the 






Agrawal, D.J. (1985): M¥måµså Uddharaˆa Koßa (The citations from Íåbara-bhå∑ya traced 
to their original sources). Pune: Vaidika Saµßodhana Maˆ∂ala. 
Ayyar, A.S. Nataraja (1952): M¥måµså Jurisprudence (the sources of Hindu Law). 
Allahabad: Ganganatha Jha Research Institute. (Ganganatha Jha Research Institute 
Series, 2.) 
Biardeau, Madeleine 1964. Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le 
brahmanisme classique. (Le Monde d'Outre-Mer Passé et Présent, première série, 
études, 23.) Paris - La Haye: Mouton. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes 1985. The origin of an Indian dietary rule: evidence for a lost 
Månava work on Dharma. Aligarh Journal of Oriental Studies 2(1-2) (Ram Suresh 
Tripathi Commemoration Volume): 123-132. 
                                                
46 Derrett 1975: I: 234: åharet tr¥ˆi vå dve vå kåmaµ ßËdrasya veßmana˙/ na hi ßËdrasya yajñe∑u kaßcid asti 
parigraha˙//. Tr. Derrett 1975: II: 345-346. 
47 Derrett 1975: I: 234: na vacanasyåtibhåro 'sty upadeßaparatvåc chåstrasya. Tr. Derrett 1975: II: 346. 
The origin of M¥måµså  19 
 
 
Bronkhorst, Johannes 1989. Studies on Bhart®hari, 2: Bhart®hari and M¥måµså. Studien zur 
Indologie und Iranistik 15: 101-117. Reprinted in:  Studies in M¥måµså. Dr. 
Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume. Ed. R.C. Dwivedi. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
1994. Pp. 371-388. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes 1996. God's arrival in the Vaiße∑ika system. Journal of 
Indian Philosophy 24: 281-294. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes 1997. Philosophy and Vedic exegesis in the M¥måµså. In: Eli Franco 
& Karin Preisendanz (eds.), Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass 
and its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies (Poznaº Studies in the 
Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, 59): 359-371. Amsterdam - Atlanta: 
Rodopi. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes 1998. Does the Veda have an author? Asiatische Studien, Études 
Asiatiques 52(1): 5-14. 
Bronkhorst, Johannes 1999. Why is there Philosophy in India? (Sixth Gonda lecture, held 
on 13 November 1998 on the premises of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts 
and Sciences.) Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.  
Bronkhorst, Johannes 2000. Karma and teleology: a problem and its solutions in Indian 
philosophy. (Studia Philologica, Monograph Series.) Tokyo: International Institute 
for Buddhist Studies.  
Bronkhorst, Johannes forthcoming. Påˆini and Euclid: reflections on Indian geometry. 
Ingalls Commemoration Volume. 
Clooney, Francis X. 1990. Thinking Ritually. Rediscovering the PËrva M¥måµså of 
Jaimini.  (Publications of the De Nobili Research Library, 17.) Vienna: Gerold & 
Co.; Leiden: E.J. Brill; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Derrett, J. Duncan M. 1973. History of Indian Law (Dharmaßåstra). Leiden etc.: E.J. Brill. 
(HdO 2/3/1.) 
Derrett, J. Duncan M. 1975. Bhåruci's Commentary on the Manusm®ti (the Manu-Íastra-
Vivaraˆa, books 6-12): Text, Translation and Notes. 2 vols. Wiesbaden: Franz 
Steiner. (SSAI, 18.) 
Deshpande, Madhav M. 1999. Vedas and their Íåkhås: contested relationships. Paper read 
at the Second International Vedic Workshop, Kyoto University, October-November 
1999. 
Devasthali, G. V. 1959. M¥måµså, the Våkya-Íåstra of Ancient India. Bombay: 
Booksellers' Publishing Company. 
Doniger, Wendy & Brian K. Smith (trs.) 1991. The Laws of Manu. Penguin Books. 
Doniger O'Flaherty, Wendy 1983. The Rig Veda: an anthology. One hundred and eight 
humns, selected, translated and annotated. Harmondsworth etc.: Penguin Books. 
Eltschinger, Vincent 1999. Dharmak¥rti contre Kumårila et l'apauru∑eyatå. Lecture given 
12.3.1999 in Lausanne. 
Eltschinger, Vincent 2000. «Caste» et philosophie bouddhique. Continuité de quelques 
arguments bouddhiques contre le traitement réaliste des dénominations sociales. 
Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien. 
(Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 47.) 
Franke, Otto 1913. D¥ghanikåya. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
Frauwallner, Erich 1968. Materialien zur ältesten Erkenntnislehre der Karmam¥måµså. 
(Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, Phil.-hist. Kl., 259. 
Bd., 2. Abhandlung.) Wien: Hermann Böhlaus. 
Garge, Damodar Vishnu 1952. Citations in Íabara-Bhå∑ya (A Study). Poona: Deccan 
College. (Deccan College Dissertation Series, 8.) 
Gonda, Jan 1968. The Mudgalopani∑ad. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 12-13, 
1968/1969 (Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens, Festschrift für Erich 
Frauwallner): 101-113. 
The origin of M¥måµså  20 
 
 
Gonda, Jan 1977. Vedic cosmogony and Vi∑ˆuite bhakti. Indologica Taurinensia 5: 85-111 
(repr. Selected Studies VI.1: 377-403, Leiden: Brill, 1991) 
Jhå, Ga∫gånåtha 1903. Kumårila Bha††a, Tantravårttika. A commentary on Íabara's Bhå∑ya 
on the PËrvam¥måµså SËtras of Jaimini. Translated into English. Vol. I. Reprint: Sri 
Satguru Publications, Delhi, 1983. 
Joshi, Lalmani 1967. Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India (during the 7th and 8th 
centuries A.D.). Delhi etc.: Motilal Banarsidass. 
Keith, Arthur Berriedale 1921. The Karma-M¥måµså. Reprint: Kanti Publication, Delhi, 
1989. 
Lásló, Franz 1971 Die Parallelversion der Manusm®ti im Bhavi∑yapuråˆa. (Abhandlungen 
für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, XL,2.) Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner. 
Lingat, Robert 1973. The Classical Law of India. Translated from the French (Les sources 
du droit dans le système traditionnel de l'Inde, The Hague 1967) with additions by J. 
Duncan M. Derrett. Reprint: Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1993. 
Masset, Danièle 2000. Une lecture bouddhiste des mythes hindous: la mise en question des 
modèles brahmaniques dans le Canon bouddhique tibétain. La norme et son 
application dans le monde indien. Ed. Marie-Luce Barazer-Billoret and Jean Fezas. 
Paris: École française d'Extrême-Orient. Pp. 155-173. 
McCrindle, J.W. (1877): Ancient India as described by Megasthenes and Arrian. Reprinted 
in: McCrindle’s Ancient India, edited by Ramchandra Jain. New Delhi: Today & 
Tomorrow’s Printers & Publishers. 1972. 
Meisig, Konrad 1988. Das SËtra von den vier Ständen. Das Aggañña-Sutta im Licht seiner 
chinesischen Parallelen. (Freiburger Beiträge zur Indologie, 20.) Wiesbaden: Otto 
Harrassowitz.  
Mesquita, Roque 1994. Die Idee der Erlösung bei Kumårilabha††a. Wiener Zeitschrift für 
die Kunde Südasiens 38: 451-484. 
Mukhopadhyaya, Sujitkumar 1960. The VajrasËc¥ of Aßvagho∑a. A study of the Sanskrit 
text and Chinese version. Revised second edition. Santiniketan: Visvabharati. 
Osier, Jean-Pierre 2000. Une critique satirique des normes brahmaniques chez les jaina: 
DhËrtåkhyåna de Haribhadra et Dharmapar¥k∑å de Hari∑eˆa. La norme et son 
application dans le monde indien. Ed. Marie-Luce Barazer-Billoret and Jean Fezas. 
Paris: École française d'Extrême-Orient. Pp. 139-153. 
Parpola, Asko 1981. On the formation of the M¥måµså and the problems concerning 
Jaimini, with particular reference to the teacher quotations and the Vedic schools. 
Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 25: 145-177. 
Parpola, Asko 1994. On the formation of the M¥måµså and the problems concerning 
Jaimini, with particular reference to the teacher quotations and the Vedic schools 
(Part II). Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 38: 293-308. 
Renou, Louis 1956. Hymnes spéculatifs du Véda. Gallimard/Unesco. 
Renou, Louis 1960. Études védiques et påˆinéennes, tome VI: Le destin du Véda dans 
l'Inde. (Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, 10.) Paris: E. de Boccard.  
Renou, Louis 1965. The Destininy of the Veda in India. Delhi etc.: Motilal Banarsidass. 
(English translation of Renou 1960) 
Rhys Davids, T.W. & C.A.F. 1921. Dialogues of the Buddha. Part III. Reprint: Pali Text 
Society, London 1977. 
Shende, N.J. 1965. The Puru∑a-sËkta in the Vedic literature. (Publications of the Centre of 
Advanced Studies in Sanskrit, Class A No. 4.) Poona: University of Poona.  
Smart, Ninian 1996. Dimensions of the Sacred. An anatomy of the world's beliefs. London: 
HarperCollins. 
Staal, Frits 1985. Substitutions de paradigmes et religions d'Asie. Cahiers d'Extrême-Asie 
1: 21-57. 
The origin of M¥måµså  21 
 
 
Staal, Frits 1995. Mantras between Fire and Water. Reflections on a Balinese rite. 
(Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Verhandelingen Afdeling 
Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 166.) Amsterdam etc.: North-Holland.  
Walshe, Maurice 1987. The Long Discourses of the Buddha. A translation of the D¥gha 
Nikåya. Boston: Wisdom. Reprint 1995. 
Weber, A. 1860. Über die Vajrasûcî (Demantnadel) des Açvaghosha. Abhandlungen der 
königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, philos.-histor. Kl., 3, 1859, pp. 
205-264. 
Wezler, Albrecht 1998. Medhåtithi on the role of Manu, the prayojana of the Manusm®ti, 
and the incentive of the Brahmins to study it. In: Paul Harrison & Gregory Schopen 
(eds.), SËryacandråya: Essays in Honour of Akira Yuyama on the Occasion of his 






BORI Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona 
Divy(V) Divyåvadåna, ed. P.L. Vaidya, Darbhanga 1959 (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, 
Darbhanga 20) 
DN D¥ghanikåya, ed. T.W. Rhys Davids, J.E. Carpenter, 3 vols. 1890-1911 
(PTS) 
HdO Handbuch der Orientalistik, Leiden 1952 ff 
Kane, HistDh Pandurang Vaman Kane, History of Dharmaßåstra, second edition, Poona: 
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 5 vols., 1968-1977 
Mahå-bh Patañjali, (Vyåkaraˆa-)Mahåbhå∑ya, ed. F. Kielhorn, Bombay 1880-1885 
Manu Manusm®ti, ed. J.L. Shastri. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983 
Mhbh Mahåbhårata, crit. ed. V.S. Sukthankar u.a., Poona 1933-41 (BORI) 
M¥S M¥måµsåsËtra (Ónandåßrama Sanskrit Series, Poona, 97). Poona, 1973-1984 
MN Majjhima-Nikåya, ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, 3 vols., London 1888-
1899 (PTS) 
PTS Pali Text Society, London 
SSAI Schriftenreihe des Südasien-Instituts der Universität Heidelberg, Wiesbaden, 
Stuttgart 
Sv Buddhaghosa, Suma∫galavilåsin¥, D¥ghanikåya-a††hakathå, éd. T.W. Rhys 
Davids, J.E. Carpenter, W. Stede, 3 tomes, London 1886-1932 (PTS) 
TaitS Taittir¥ya Saµhitå 
TanVår Tantravårttika of Kumårilabha††a (Ónandåßrama Sanskrit Series, Poona, 97). 
Poona, 1973-1984 
WI Word Index to the Praßastapådabhå∑ya: A complete word index to the printed 
editions of the Praßastapådabhå∑ya, by Johannes Bronkhorst & Yves 
Ramseier, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994 
 
